

Landmark Ruling by Federal Court of Australia on Crypto Margin Extensions

October 8, 2024

In the recent case of **Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Bit Trade Pty Ltd [2024] FCA 953**, the Federal Court delivered a pivotal judgment that resonates deeply within the cryptocurrency industry. The court scrutinized the nature of Bit Trade's "Margin Extension" product, ultimately finding that it constitutes a credit facility under Australian law. This finding has significant implications for crypto exchanges operating in Australia, particularly regarding regulatory compliance.

Bit Trade, trading as Kraken in Australia, offers a platform where customers can purchase and sell digital assets, including cryptocurrencies. One of their offerings is the "**Margin Extension**" product, which allows customers to receive extensions of margin—in the form of digital assets or legal tender—to make spot purchases and sales of digital assets on the Kraken Exchange.

The crux of the case revolved around whether the Margin Extension product is a financial product requiring a **target market determination (TMD)** under **Part 7.8A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)**. The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) alleged that Bit Trade contravened sections 994B(1) and (2) of the Act by issuing this product to retail clients without first making a TMD.

Bit Trade contended that the product was exempt under **regulation 7.8A.20 of the Corporations Regulations**, arguing that it did not involve a "deferred debt" as required by

subparagraph (a) of regulation 2B(3) of the **ASIC Regulations**. They asserted that obligations arising from the Margin Extension did not constitute a debt because they might not involve an obligation to pay money.

However, the court disagreed. **Justice Nicholas** meticulously analyzed the Terms of Service (TOS) under which the Margin Extension product was offered. He highlighted that the provision of a Margin Extension in national currency, such as Australian or US dollars, indeed gives rise to a **“deferred debt”**.

From the judgment:

“The provision of a Margin Extension in national currency (including in Australian or US dollars) gives rise to a ‘deferred debt’ which is incurred by the customer when they are provided with the Margin Extension and which becomes payable upon the customer ceasing to be eligible to receive the Margin Extension.”

This finding was pivotal. It established that the Margin Extension is a **credit facility involving credit of a kind referred to in subparagraph (a) of regulation 2B(3) of the ASIC Regulations**. Consequently, the exception under regulation 7.8A.20 did not apply.

Justice Nicholas further elaborated:

“By issuing the Product to retail clients without having first made a target market determination for the Product, Bit Trade contravened s 994B(1) of the Corporations Act when read with s 994B(2).”

The court’s reasoning hinged on the interpretation of “debt” within the regulatory framework. Bit Trade argued that “debt” implies an obligation to pay money and that cryptocurrency is not money. Therefore, obligations to return cryptocurrency do

not create a debt. However, the court noted that the Margin Extension could be provided in national currency, and obligations arising from such transactions do constitute a debt.

Justice Nicholas emphasized:

“An obligation to pay an amount of cryptocurrency of some type is not an obligation to pay a sum of money and therefore cannot be a debt... However, in circumstances where a Margin Extension is provided by Bit Trade in a national currency... this amounts to ‘a conditional but unavoidable obligation to pay a sum of money at a future time.’”

The judgment underscores the importance of understanding how financial regulations apply to products offered in the crypto space, especially when traditional financial concepts like “debt” intersect with digital assets. The court’s interpretation aligns with the view that when a product involves an obligation to repay in national currency, it falls within the ambit of a credit facility under the regulations.

For crypto exchanges and service providers, this case serves as a cautionary tale. Offering products that involve financial accommodations in national currency without adhering to regulatory requirements can lead to significant legal repercussions. The need for a **target market determination** is not merely a procedural formality but a critical compliance requirement designed to protect consumers.

The court’s decision also reflects a broader trend of regulators and courts applying existing financial laws to the evolving crypto industry. While cryptocurrencies themselves may not be considered money in the traditional sense, products and services involving them can still be subject to financial regulations when they intersect with national currencies or create obligations akin to traditional financial instruments.

In conclusion, the **Federal Court's judgment in ASIC v Bit Trade** reinforces the necessity for crypto businesses to diligently assess their products against the regulatory landscape. The provision of margin extensions in national currency creates a **deferred debt**, categorizing the product as a credit facility requiring compliance with specific provisions of the Corporations Act.

As the crypto industry continues to mature, adherence to regulatory obligations becomes ever more critical. Exchanges must ensure that they are not only innovative in their offerings but also compliant with the laws that govern financial products. This case highlights that the intersection of crypto and traditional finance is not a legal vacuum; existing laws can and will be applied to new technologies and products.

The judgment serves as a reminder that while cryptocurrencies may challenge traditional notions of money and finance, the legal frameworks in place are adaptable. Businesses operating in this space must stay informed and proactive in their compliance efforts to navigate the complex regulatory environment successfully.

The decision reaffirms the principle that innovative financial products are not beyond the reach of existing legal and regulatory frameworks. Companies must ensure that their offerings are compliant, thereby safeguarding both their operations and their customers.

Author: Mahmoud Abuwaseel

Title: Partner – Disputes

Email: mabuwaseel@waselandwaseel.com

Profile:

<https://waselandwaseel.com/about/mahmoud-abuwaseel/>

Lawyers and consultants.

Tier-1 services since 1799.

www.waselandwaseel.com

business@waselandwaseel.com

Supreme Court of Western Australia on the Limits of Expert Determination vs. Arbitration

October 8, 2024

The **judgment** in *Silverstream SEZC v Titan Minerals Ltd* from the Supreme Court of Western Australia shines a light on a vital and often misunderstood aspect of **dispute resolution**—the interaction between **expert determination** and **arbitration**. The case pivots around the **refusal of a stay of proceedings** sought by Titan Minerals Ltd (“Titan”), based on a clause in a set of **royalty agreements** that mandated disputes related to the **calculation of royalties** be referred to **expert determination**. What emerges from the court’s reasoning is a nuanced understanding of the differences between these two forms of **alternative dispute resolution** (ADR) and the conditions under which courts should intervene.

At the heart of the dispute, Silverstream SEZC (“Silverstream”) accused Titan of breaching several **royalty agreements** by failing to maintain mining properties in good standing, thus forfeiting the entitlements that generated the royalties. Titan responded by tendering alternative royalties and sought to stay the court proceedings, arguing that the dispute over the valuation of these substituted royalties should be determined by an expert, as stipulated in the agreements. However, Justice Solomon, presiding over the case, disagreed and dismissed the application for a stay, offering a rich commentary on the broader relationship between expert determination and arbitration.

Expert determination is a consensual process where parties agree to have an independent expert resolve specific technical issues. This process is typically informal, **speedy**, and effective for disputes requiring specialized knowledge, such as those involving **technical valuations**. However, unlike **arbitration**, which is governed by a legislative framework—such as the **Commercial Arbitration Act 2012 (WA)** in this case—expert determination does not automatically trigger a stay of proceedings. This is because expert determination, by its nature, is intended to resolve **specific, often narrow technical issues**, while arbitration can address the **entirety of a dispute**.

Justice Solomon made a critical distinction between the scope of disputes appropriate for expert determination versus those suitable for arbitration. He underscored that while **arbitration** is a comprehensive dispute resolution mechanism, designed to deal with all facets of a conflict, **expert determination** is more limited in scope, typically confined to particular **technical or factual issues**. The court emphasized that even if a dispute concerning the **valuation of royalties** might be subject to expert determination, this did not preclude the court from addressing other issues, such as **breaches of contract** and the appropriate **remedies** for such breaches.

The court's refusal to grant the stay was rooted in its interpretation of the royalty agreements, specifically **Clause 9**, which mandated expert determination for disputes regarding the **calculation of gross revenue or royalties**. Justice Solomon noted that the current dispute was not genuinely about the **calculation or valuation** of the royalties—at least not yet—but rather about whether Titan had breached its obligations under the agreements by failing to maintain the mining properties in good standing. Since this issue did not fall within the scope of Clause 9, it was not appropriate to stay the proceedings in favor of expert determination.

Justice Solomon also considered the broader **principles** governing the exercise of discretion in staying proceedings. He observed that courts generally respect the **parties' agreements** to resolve disputes in a specified manner, but only when the dispute actually falls within the scope of the agreed process. Where a dispute does not lend itself to expert determination or where the dispute encompasses issues beyond the expertise of the appointed expert, a court should be cautious in granting a stay. This aligns with the principle that **parties should be held to their bargains** only when the agreed process is suitable and just for resolving the dispute.

A key takeaway from the judgment is the emphasis on the **specificity** of the issues being referred to expert determination. The court acknowledged that expert determination is designed to resolve **technical questions**—for instance, the fair market value of royalties derived from mining operations—but it is not equipped to handle broader legal questions, such as whether a party has breached its contractual obligations. As Justice Solomon noted, staying proceedings in such a scenario could result in **duplication of effort** and potentially **multiplicity of proceedings**, which runs contrary to the principles of **efficient dispute resolution**.

The judgment also illustrates the importance of **evidence** and **procedural fairness** in the context of expert determination. Silverstream had sought substantiation for the valuation of the replacement royalties tendered by Titan, which Titan had not provided. The court found that without such substantiation, it was premature to characterize the dispute as one solely about valuation and, consequently, premature to refer the matter to expert determination.

In a broader comparative perspective, this judgment serves as a reminder that while both **expert determination** and **arbitration** are valuable tools in the arsenal of ADR, they serve distinct purposes. **Arbitration** is a more formal and expansive process, suitable for resolving entire disputes,

while **expert determination** is a more limited mechanism, typically employed for resolving **specific technical issues**. Courts, therefore, play a crucial role in determining the appropriate scope and application of these processes, ensuring that disputes are resolved in a manner that is both **fair** and **efficient**.

The *Silverstream* decision reinforces the idea that not all disputes are apt for expert determination, particularly when the issues at hand extend beyond mere technical calculations and touch upon broader legal rights and obligations. In such cases, the courts retain a vital oversight function, ensuring that parties are held to their agreements only when it is just and appropriate to do so.

Author: Mahmoud Abuwaseel

Title: Partner – Disputes

Email: mabuwaseel@waselandwaseel.com

Profile:

<https://waselandwaseel.com/about/mahmoud-abuwaseel/>

Lawyers and consultants.

Tier-1 services since 1799.

www.waselandwaseel.com

business@waselandwaseel.com

Australian High Court on Functus Officio and De Novo Review of Arbitration Awards

October 8, 2024

The High Court of Australia's ruling in **CBI Constructors Pty Ltd v Chevron Australia Pty Ltd [2024] HCA 28** marks a significant development in the jurisprudence surrounding the **finality of arbitral awards** and the extent to which courts can intervene in arbitral proceedings. This decision centers on whether an arbitral tribunal, after issuing an interim award,

could revisit issues that were argued to be conclusively settled by that interim award. The Court's ruling provides important guidance on the application of the **functus officio** doctrine and the standard of judicial review for setting aside arbitral awards under the **Commercial Arbitration Act 2012 (WA)**.

Background

The dispute between CBI Constructors Pty Ltd ("CKJV") and Chevron Australia Pty Ltd arose from a contract related to the Gorgon Project, a major offshore oil and gas development. CKJV, under the contract, supplied staff for the project, and a dispute emerged over the reimbursement of staff costs. CKJV argued that Chevron underpaid, while Chevron counterclaimed that it had overpaid.

The arbitration was conducted under the **UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules** and was bifurcated into separate hearings on liability and quantum. The arbitral tribunal issued an interim award in December 2018 (the "First Interim Award"), addressing all liability issues. The tribunal concluded that CKJV was entitled only to actual costs, rejecting CKJV's claim for higher contractual rates.

Following this, CKJV sought to advance a new argument—the "Contract Criteria Case"—which pertained to how the "actual costs" should be calculated. Chevron objected, arguing that the tribunal was **functus officio** and thus lacked the authority to address any further liability issues. Despite these objections, the tribunal issued a second interim award (the "Second Interim Award"), allowing CKJV's new argument to proceed.

Chevron then applied to the Supreme Court of Western Australia to set aside the Second Interim Award, arguing it exceeded the tribunal's jurisdiction. The Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal agreed with Chevron, finding that the tribunal was

functus officio and had overstepped its jurisdiction by revisiting liability issues settled by the First Interim Award. CKJV appealed to the High Court of Australia.

The High Court's Decision

The High Court was tasked with determining two central issues:

1. **Whether the tribunal was functus officio** after issuing the First Interim Award, thus precluding it from addressing the Contract Criteria Case in the Second Interim Award.
2. **Whether the Supreme Court of Western Australia applied the correct standard of review** in setting aside the Second Interim Award.

Functus Officio and the Scope of Tribunal Authority

The High Court's analysis began with the principle of **functus officio**—the idea that once a tribunal has issued a final decision on a matter, it cannot revisit that decision. However, the Court found that this principle did not apply in the manner the lower courts had concluded. The Court stated, **"The end result is that the search for a justification for a conclusion by a court that the First Interim Award rendered the arbitral tribunal functus officio with respect to the matters the subject of that award fails."** This meant that the tribunal retained jurisdiction to issue the Second Interim Award.

The Court emphasized that the First Interim Award, while final on the issues it addressed, did not cover all aspects of the dispute. Specifically, it did not conclusively resolve how the "actual costs" should be calculated, leaving room for further determination. As such, the tribunal was within its rights to address the Contract Criteria Case in the Second Interim Award.

The Court highlighted that **"an award can be 'final' in a**

number of ways or senses,” and in this instance, the First Interim Award was final only concerning the issues it explicitly resolved. The tribunal’s decision to entertain the Contract Criteria Case in the Second Interim Award did not overstep its jurisdiction.

Judicial Review and the Standard of Intervention

On the second issue, the High Court scrutinized the standard of review applied by the Supreme Court. CKJV had argued that the courts should defer to the tribunal’s interpretation of its own jurisdiction. However, the High Court found that the courts were entitled to conduct a **de novo** review when jurisdictional questions arose. The Court affirmed that **“the correctness standard has been adopted”** in such cases, meaning the courts should independently assess whether the tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction.

However, the High Court ultimately determined that the tribunal had not exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the Second Interim Award. As a result, the Court concluded that the Supreme Court had erred in setting aside the award, as there was no basis for concluding that the tribunal acted beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement.

Implications for Arbitration Practice

The High Court’s decision in **CBI Constructors Pty Ltd v Chevron Australia Pty Ltd** reinforces the **finality of arbitral awards** while also acknowledging the flexibility of tribunals to manage the arbitration process, including issuing multiple awards on different aspects of a dispute. The ruling clarifies that tribunals are not *functus officio* in relation to issues that remain unresolved, even after an interim award has been made.

This case also underscores the limited scope of judicial intervention in arbitration. Courts are empowered to review

arbitral awards, but only within strict confines. The High Court's emphasis on the **de novo** standard for reviewing jurisdictional issues reaffirms that while courts have a role in overseeing arbitration, their intervention is appropriately circumscribed to ensure that the arbitration process remains efficient and final, consistent with the parties' agreement.

In summary, the decision serves as a reminder that while arbitration provides a final and binding resolution to disputes, the tribunal's authority is not extinguished by interim decisions unless those decisions fully resolve the issues in question. This ruling will likely influence the conduct of future arbitrations, particularly in how parties and tribunals structure interim awards and approach unresolved issues.

Author: Mahmoud Abuwaseel

Title: Partner – Disputes

Email: mabuwaseel@waselandwaseel.com

Profile:

<https://waselandwaseel.com/about/mahmoud-abuwaseel/>

Lawyers and consultants.

Tier-1 services since 1799.

www.waselandwaseel.com

business@waselandwaseel.com

Subpoenas in Arbitration in Australia: Recent Guidance by the Supreme Court of Victoria

October 8, 2024

In the recent decision of *Carlisle Homes Pty Ltd v Schiavello Construction (Vic) Pty Ltd* [2024] VSC 283, Justice Croft of the Supreme Court of Victoria has provided a critical judgment that underscores the principles governing the issuance of

subpoenas in the context of commercial arbitration. This ruling, delivered on May 31, 2024, is a significant addition to the jurisprudence on arbitration and reinforces the court's supportive role in arbitral proceedings.

Background of the Case

The dispute arose between Schiavello Construction (Vic) Pty Ltd ('Schiavello') and Carlisle Homes Pty Ltd ('Carlisle') over the management of fit-out works at a property in Mulgrave. Schiavello, the applicant in the arbitral proceedings, sought subpoenas to compel the production of documents from three third parties involved in the installation and testing of services at the property.

Carlisle's application for the issuance of these subpoenas was made under Section 27A of the Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 (Vic) ('CAA'), which allows for court assistance in the arbitration process by issuing subpoenas for documents and examinations.

Key Issues and Submissions

Carlisle argued that the documents sought were crucial to resolving the core issues in the arbitration, specifically regarding the installation and commissioning of mechanical services and the achievement of practical completion under the relevant contract. **The application was unopposed, and the Arbitrator, David Levin KC, had provided consent for Carlisle to seek the subpoenas, reflecting a harmonious approach to procedural cooperation.**

Legislative Framework

Section 27A of the CAA and Rule 9.14 of the Supreme Court (Miscellaneous Civil Proceedings) Rules 2018 govern the issuance of subpoenas in arbitration. **The legislation requires that the court be satisfied of the necessity and**

reasonableness of the subpoenas and mandates that the application must be accompanied by an affidavit and a draft subpoena. These provisions ensure that the court exercises its coercive powers judiciously, particularly when non-parties to the arbitration are involved.

Court's Reasoning and Principles Applied

Justice Croft meticulously examined the application against the legislative requirements and existing case law. In his reasoning, he highlighted several pivotal principles:

- 1. Deference to the Arbitral Tribunal:** Justice Croft emphasized that the court should show deference to the arbitral tribunal's judgment. This principle stems from the parties' consent to arbitration and the tribunal's proximity to the dispute's factual matrix. **The court should avoid 'second-guessing' the tribunal's decisions unless there is a compelling reason to do so.**
- 2. Reasonableness of the Subpoena:** The court must independently verify that the subpoena's issuance is reasonable. This includes ensuring that the documents sought are relevant to the dispute and that the subpoena is for a legitimate forensic purpose. **The court's role is not to act as a 'rubber stamp' but to provide thoughtful judicial oversight to support the arbitral process.**
- 3. Minimizing Cost and Delay:** Justice Croft underscored the importance of minimizing costs and delays in arbitration, which is a primary advantage of this form of dispute resolution. The court's intervention should be swift and efficient, avoiding unnecessary procedural complexities that could burden the arbitration.

Implications of the Decision

The judgment in Carlisle Homes Pty Ltd v Schiavello Construction (Vic) Pty Ltd sets a precedent for the court's

approach to supporting arbitration through the issuance of subpoenas. It affirms that while the court must ensure compliance with statutory requirements, it should also facilitate the arbitration process by respecting the arbitral tribunal's role and decisions.

This decision is particularly noteworthy for its reinforcement of the principle that the court should not act as a mere formality in arbitration-related applications. Instead, it should provide substantive judicial support that enhances the arbitration's efficacy and integrity.

Conclusion

The ruling in *Carlisle Homes Pty Ltd v Schiavello Construction (Vic) Pty Ltd [2024] VSC 283* is a significant contribution to commercial arbitration law. **It highlights the delicate balance the court must maintain between exercising its coercive powers judiciously and supporting the arbitral process efficiently.** This decision will undoubtedly guide future applications for subpoenas in arbitration, ensuring that they are handled with the necessary judicial scrutiny while fostering an arbitration-friendly legal environment.

For practitioners and parties involved in arbitration, this judgment provides a clear framework for understanding the court's role in the arbitration process and underscores the importance of procedural cooperation and judicial deference to arbitral tribunals. As commercial arbitration continues to evolve, such landmark decisions will play a crucial role in shaping a robust and supportive legal infrastructure for dispute resolution.

Author: Mahmoud Abuwasel

Title: Partner – Disputes

Email: mabuwasel@waselandwasel.com

Profile:

<https://waselandwasel.com/about/mahmoud-abuwasel/>

Lawyers and consultants.

Tier-1 services since 1799.

www.waselandwasel.com

business@waselandwasel.com

NSW Supreme Court Enforces Arbitration Despite Waived Preconditions in Icon SI v. ANSTO

October 8, 2024

Brief

In the pivotal case of *Icon Si (Aust) Pty Ltd v Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation* [2024] NSWSC 324, the Supreme Court of New South Wales rendered a decision that emphatically underscores the judiciary's commitment to enforcing arbitration clauses within commercial contracts. The case arose from a dispute concerning a construction contract for the SyMo Facility at Lucas Heights, leading to issues between contract amendment and dispute resolution clauses.

Facts

Icon Si (Aust) Pty Ltd (Icon) engaged in a contract with the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) to construct the SyMo Facility for a substantial sum. The contract incorporated a clause specifying dispute resolution procedures, including expert determination followed by arbitration if necessary. Following disputes, the parties amended the contract, waiving the expert determination but not expressly affecting the arbitration clause. ANSTO sought to enforce the arbitration agreement following further disputes, while Icon resisted, leading to court proceedings.

Arguments

Icon argued against the arbitration, contending that the amendment deed, which waived expert determination, effectively made the arbitration clause inoperative since one of the prerequisites for arbitration (the completion or waiver of expert determination) could no longer be met. They interpreted the contract and amendment as leaving no path open to arbitration.

Defenses

In contrast, ANSTO maintained that the waiver of expert determination was not intended to negate the overarching agreement to resolve disputes through arbitration. They argued that the contract, read as a whole and in light of the amendment deed, still mandated arbitration for unresolved disputes, emphasizing the contract's and the amendment deed's language and commercial objectives.

Court Interpretation

The Court sided with ANSTO, holding that the arbitration clause remained operative and binding. It determined that the parties' intention, viewed through the lens of the contract's language and the commercial context, supported the continuation of the arbitration pathway for dispute resolution. The Court highlighted that the waiver of expert determination did not equate to a waiver of arbitration but simply removed one tier of the multi-tiered dispute resolution process. Thus, disputes were still subject to arbitration as per the contract's terms.

The Honourable Justice Ball highlighted this as follows:

"As I have explained, before the Amendment Deed was executed, the parties had agreed ultimately to submit all their disputes to arbitration except to the extent that those disputes were finally resolved by expert determination. The intermediate step of expert determination was an option offered by the standard terms that formed part of their contract. Initially,

the parties agreed to adopt that option through the mechanism provided in the standard terms of indicating in Annexure Part A that the option applied. When they subsequently agreed to “waive” that option, they must have intended to dispense with the option they had previously agreed to adopt. They could not have intended at the same time to dispense with their agreement ultimately to resolve all disputes by arbitration. That would involve a fundamental change to the dispute resolution mechanism they had agreed to adopt.”

This interpretation leaned heavily on principles of commercial contract construction, focusing on the parties’ intentions and the contract’s commercial purpose. The Court also referred to statutory provisions under the *Commercial Arbitration Act 2010* (NSW), affirming the act’s purpose to uphold arbitration agreements unless clearly null, void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed.

Significance

The *Icon Si v. ANSTO* decision marks a significant contribution to the body of jurisprudence surrounding arbitration in commercial disputes in Australia. Its core significance lies in the Court’s determination that an arbitration agreement stands resilient, even when its prerequisites are waived by the parties.

This ruling directly addresses a nuanced area of dispute resolution law by clarifying that parties’ agreement to bypass certain pre-arbitration steps, such as expert determination, does not inherently invalidate or render the subsequent arbitration agreement inoperative.

Author: Mahmoud Abuwasel

Title: Partner – Disputes

Email: mabuwasel@waselandwasel.com

Profile:

<https://waselandwasel.com/about/mahmoud-abuwasel/>

Lawyers and consultants.

Tier-1 services since 1799.

www.waselandwasel.com

business@waselandwasel.com

High Court of Australia Considers Australian Hague Rules in International Shipping Arbitration

October 8, 2024

Introduction to the Dispute

In the case of Carmichael Rail Network Pty Ltd v BBC Chartering Carriers GmbH & Co KG [2024] HCA 4, the High Court of Australia delivered a judgment that underscores the robustness of arbitration agreements in international commercial contracts, even when faced with statutory provisions aimed at protecting domestic legal standards. The dispute centered around an arbitration clause in a bill of lading, which Carmichael Rail Network Pty Ltd (Carmichael) argued was rendered inoperative by Article 3(8) of the Australian Hague Rules, as incorporated into the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1991 (Cth) (COGSA). This provision voids any contractual clause that relieves or lessens a carrier's liability for loss or damage to goods, except as provided in the Rules.

The Core Issue

The crux of the matter was whether the arbitration clause, mandating dispute resolution in London under English law, could potentially diminish the carrier's liability contrary to the Australian Hague Rules. The Federal Court of Australia, upon considering an undertaking by BBC Chartering Carriers

GmbH & Co KG (BBC) to adhere to the Australian Hague Rules as applied under Australian law in the arbitration, and a subsequent declaration to that effect, decided to stay the proceedings in favor of arbitration.

High Court's Rationale

The High Court's decision to dismiss the appeal reaffirms the principle that arbitration agreements should be upheld unless it is proven on a balance of probabilities that such agreements would invalidate the carrier's liability in a manner not sanctioned by the relevant statutory rules. The Court clarified that speculative risks concerning the potential outcomes of arbitration do not suffice to render an arbitration clause void under Article 3(8). It emphasized that the standard of proof required is not mere speculation or the possibility of a clause lessening liability but must be established on the balance of probabilities.

Implications of the Judgment

This judgment has significant implications for the enforceability of arbitration clauses in international shipping contracts, particularly those involving Australian parties. It signals a strong preference for respecting the autonomy of commercial parties to decide their dispute resolution mechanisms, provided there is no concrete evidence that such mechanisms would contravene mandatory statutory protections. The decision also highlights the importance of undertakings and declarations in assuaging concerns about the potential for arbitration to circumvent local legal standards.

Legal Analysis by the High Court

In reaching its decision, the High Court considered the arguments with a focus on Article 3(8) of the Australian Hague Rules and its impact on the arbitration clause. The Court's analysis was grounded in the legal principles governing sea carriage and international arbitration.

Examination of Article 3(8)

The Court first looked at the text of Article 3(8), aimed at preventing contractual terms that could reduce a carrier's statutory liabilities. It highlighted that the Article's language does not support speculative risks or hypothetical outcomes from arbitration. Instead, it demands clear evidence that the arbitration clause would likely lead to a reduction of the carrier's liability against the Rules.

Context and Purpose of the Australian Hague Rules

The Court also examined the context and purpose of the Australian Hague Rules within international maritime law. It noted that these Rules strike a balance between carriers and shippers, offering a uniform legal framework for global sea transport. The Court stressed that interpreting Article 3(8) should maintain this balance and not disrupt the certainty the Rules aim to establish.

The Role of Undertakings and Declarations

Significantly, the Court considered the undertaking by BBC and the Federal Court's declaration, which assured that the Australian Hague Rules, as applied under Australian law, would govern the arbitration. This commitment by BBC addressed concerns that arbitration might bypass the statutory protections of the Australian Hague Rules.

Standard of Proof Under Article 3(8)

Furthermore, the Court clarified the standard of proof under Article 3(8), stating that speculative risks are inadequate to invalidate an arbitration clause. The challenging party must prove, with reasonable certainty, that the clause would indeed lessen the carrier's statutory liability. This approach reflects the Court's intent to uphold arbitration agreements while safeguarding statutory rights.

Overview of the Australian Hague Rules

The Australian Hague Rules refer to a set of regulations that govern the international carriage of goods by sea, specifically as they are adopted and applied within Australian law. These rules are a modified version of the original Hague Rules, which were established by the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading, signed in Brussels in 1924. The modifications are often influenced by subsequent amendments, such as those from the Visby Amendments (1968) and the SDR Protocol (1979), leading to what is commonly referred to as the Hague-Visby Rules.

Conclusion and Future Implications

The High Court's decision in Carmichael Rail Network Pty Ltd v BBC Chartering Carriers GmbH & Co KG demonstrates a careful approach to disputes involving international arbitration and maritime law. The Court emphasized the need for concrete evidence over speculative risks, the importance of maintaining the balance established by maritime conventions, and the effectiveness of undertakings and declarations in ensuring arbitration does not undermine statutory protections. This judgment provides clear guidance for future cases on the enforceability of arbitration clauses in international shipping contracts.

Author: Mahmoud Abuwaseh

Title: Partner – Disputes

Email: mabuwaseh@waselandwaseh.com

Profile:

<https://waselandwaseh.com/about/mahmoud-abuwaseh/>

Lawyers and consultants.

Tier-1 services since 1799.

www.waselandwaseh.com

business@waselandwaseh.com

Supreme Court of Victoria Affirms Judicial Restraint in Arbitral Appeals

October 8, 2024

In the realm of arbitration, the delicate balance between finality and fairness often finds itself at the heart of appellate scrutiny. The recent judgment from the Victorian Supreme Court in *Factory X Pty Ltd v Gorman Services Pty Ltd* unveils yet another layer of this intricate interplay, particularly focusing on the threshold for leave to appeal questions of law emanating from arbitration awards. The court's reasoning, deeply rooted in the principles laid down by Lady Justice Arden in *HMV UK Ltd v Propinvest Friar Limited Partnership*, provides a rich tapestry for understanding the nuanced approach towards the 'obviously wrong' standard under s 34A(3)(c) of the Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 (Vic).

The focal point of the discourse centers around Lady Justice Arden's clarification of an 'obviously wrong' decision as one that is unarguable, makes a false leap in logic, reaches a result for which there is no reasonable explanation, or represents a major intellectual aberration. The respondent, in underscoring these parameters, argued that a mere arguable error on a point of law or a divergent conclusion by the judge does not suffice to meet the threshold of 'obviously wrong'. The clarity and transparency of the error, as emphasized by the respondent, stand as indispensable requisites to traverse the appellate pathway.

The court, in its analysis, concurred with the respondent's submissions, accentuating that the arbitrator's decision

should not be deemed 'obviously wrong' merely because the court might harbor a different interpretation of a contractual clause. This stance resonates with the fundamental ethos of arbitration, where deference to the arbitrator's decision is emblematic of the autonomy and finality that arbitration envisages.

Furthermore, the court's acknowledgment of the arbitrator's rejection of the applicant's construction in the arbitration award underscores the appellate reluctance to re-engage with matters of critical relevance already deliberated and dismissed by the arbitrator. This judicial restraint is emblematic of a broader jurisprudential acknowledgment of the arbitrator's role as the primary adjudicator of disputes, whose decisions are to be interfered with sparingly and only under manifestly erroneous circumstances.

The South Australian Court of Appeal's stance in *Inghams Enterprises* (10 February 2022), as highlighted by the court, further cements this principle. Despite recognizing the 'some force' in Inghams' submissions and the complex nature of the construction question, the Court was unpersuaded that the arbitrator's decision displayed any 'obvious error'. This narrative underscores the high threshold that appellants must surmount to successfully navigate the appellate avenue.

In dissecting the contract clause, the court acknowledged the lack of clarity in its drafting and the applicant's submissions on the practical implications of the arbitrator's construction. However, the court remained unswayed by the possible merits of the applicant's construction, reiterating that the arbitrator's conclusion was not 'obviously wrong' for the purposes of s 34A of the Act. The arbitrator's meticulous consideration of other possible constructions, including those submitted by the applicant, fortified the court's stance against an obvious error in the arbitrator's decision.

This judgment, in its essence, epitomizes the judicial

restraint and deference towards arbitration awards, reinforcing the high threshold for leave to appeal on questions of law. It underscores the imperative for clear and transparent errors in arbitration awards to warrant appellate intervention, thereby preserving the sanctity and finality of arbitration as a distinct and autonomous mechanism for dispute resolution..

Author: Mahmoud Abuwaseel

Title: Partner – Disputes

Email: mabuwasel@waselandwasel.com

Profile:

<https://waselandwasel.com/about/mahmoud-abuwasel/>

Lawyers and consultants.

Tier-1 services since 1799.

www.waselandwasel.com

business@waselandwasel.com

Unveiling the Veil of Arbitration Secrecy: The Supreme Court of Western Australia in Wright Prospecting v Hancock Prospecting

October 8, 2024

Introduction

The issue of confidentiality in arbitration proceedings has been a subject of considerable debate and judicial scrutiny. The recent case of Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd v Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd [2023] WASC 285 issued on 31 July 2023 in

the Supreme Court of Western Australia provides a compelling backdrop to explore this complex issue. This article will delve into the nuances of confidentiality in arbitration, with a particular focus on the Wright Prospecting case, while also referencing other seminal cases that have shaped this area of law.

The Essence of Confidentiality in Arbitration: A Case Spotlight

Confidentiality is often cited as one of the key advantages of arbitration over traditional litigation. In the case of Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd v Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd, the court grappled with the issue of whether interim suppression or non-publication orders were necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice. The case serves as a vivid illustration of the delicate balance courts must strike between upholding confidentiality and ensuring open justice.

Judicial Tests for Confidentiality: The Wright Prospecting Lens

In Wright Prospecting, the court applied several judicial tests to assess the scope of confidentiality. One such test was the “necessity test,” which is often used to weigh the need for confidentiality against the public interest in open justice. This test has its roots in the case of Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman (1995) 183 CLR 10, where the court held that the efficacy of private arbitration could be compromised if proceedings were made public.

Another judicial test is the “reasonable purpose test,” which allows for the disclosure of confidential information if it is necessary for the establishment or protection of a party’s legal rights in relation to a third party. This test was highlighted in the context of s 27F(5) of the Commercial Arbitration Act, a provision that was also considered in Wright Prospecting.

Caselaw Shaping Confidentiality: The Interplay with Wright Prospecting

The Wright Prospecting case does not exist in a vacuum; it is part of a rich tapestry of jurisprudence on the subject of arbitration confidentiality. In *EBJ21 v EB021*, the court summarized the uniform confidentiality provisions of commercial arbitration legislation, emphasizing the importance of confidentiality but also noting that parties could opt out.

In *R v Legal Aid Board; Ex parte Kaim Todner* [1998] EWCA Civ 958; [1999] QB 966, the court emphasized that the parties' agreement on confidentiality was not determinative, thereby preserving the court's supervisory role. This principle was also evident in *Wright Prospecting*, where the court had to consider whether the orders sought were in the public interest.

The Public Interest Conundrum: Lessons from Wright Prospecting

The Wright Prospecting case serves as a poignant reminder that while the principle of confidentiality is generally upheld, there are instances where the public interest in the administration of justice may necessitate a departure from this norm. The principle of open justice was a significant consideration in the court's decision, echoing sentiments expressed in *Scott v Scott*, where the House of Lords held that the court had no power to hear a suit in camera solely based on the parties' agreement.

Conclusion

The case of *Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd v Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd* serves as a crucial touchstone in the ongoing debate about the scope and limitations of confidentiality in arbitration proceedings. While the court upheld the general principle of confidentiality, it also made it clear that this is not an absolute right and must be balanced against other considerations, such as the public interest in open justice.

This nuanced approach is consistent with earlier caselaw and provides valuable insights for parties considering arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism.

Author: Mahmoud Abuwasef

Title: Partner – Disputes

Email: mabuwasel@waselandwasel.com

Profile:

<https://waselandwasel.com/about/mahmoud-abuwasel/>

Lawyers and consultants.

Tier-1 services since 1799.

www.waselandwasel.com

business@waselandwasel.com

Legal Risk for Australian Businesses in Cross-Border Transactions

October 8, 2024

In the intricate matrix of cross-border legal risks, Australian enterprises are met with the most acute and perturbing challenges when they encounter situations such as insolvency, litigation, or arbitration with an international facet. However, these situations represent but a minute fraction of the total scenarios. A minuscule number of disputes possess the fortitude to bear the substantial costs and complexities linked with cross-border litigation or arbitration.

It is of note that a significant portion of the bankruptcies and insolvencies befalling the cross-border spectrum predominantly involve small-scale businesses. This is despite the fact that larger enterprises tend to be the predominant actors in the cross-border domain. The harsh realities and

hardships of cross-border legal troubles disproportionately impact these smaller businesses, a factor that must not be overlooked when addressing such risks.

Given these conditions, civil remedies, which were once considered a feasible commercial option, increasingly prove to be unrealistic. The practical challenges presented by cross-border litigation have resulted in a situation where these remedies are more of an exception than a rule.

The extant mechanisms devised to tackle such complex cross-border issues exhibit an erratic and limited scope. The sporadic nature and limited efficacy of these mechanisms point towards an urgent need for a comprehensive solution. This deficiency underscores the importance of developing a robust, systematic, and consistent framework that can aid Australian businesses in effectively managing cross-border legal risks and uncertainties, a task which is undeniably significant in today's globalised economic landscape.

Navigating cross-border legal risk

The navigation of cross-border legal risk is a delicate exercise, requiring careful consideration of a range of strategic options. These strategies often involve nuanced risk management processes tailored to the unique circumstances and risks involved.

Consider an exporter: to circumvent the risk of a buyer's default, the exporter might transfer payment risk to its bank through the use of documentary credits. This financial instrument effectively shifts the responsibility of payment to a bank, which guarantees payment as long as the exporter meets certain agreed conditions. The intricate mechanics of these instruments offer a form of insurance to the exporter, who is then able to conduct international business with lessened financial anxiety.

Similarly, joint venture arrangements may necessitate an

entirely different approach. Here, a carefully crafted agreement could dictate the apportionment of distinct legal risks among the participants. For instance, one joint venture partner might assume the regulatory risks associated with a particular jurisdiction, while the other takes on the operational risks. These contractual understandings provide a foundation for the distribution of liability, allowing each party to focus on its areas of strength and expertise.

The method of foreign law impact mitigation, or “quarantining” of risk, involves designing the company structure in such a way that risk is contained within a particular subsidiary. By segregating business units or processes that are exposed to high levels of foreign legal risk, the company can effectively limit the potential exposure of its overall operations to any detrimental legal consequences. This approach allows a firm to participate in potentially high-risk ventures without exposing the entire organization to these risks, in effect insulating the parent company and its other subsidiaries.

Yet another approach is the pricing of risk, where firms integrate the increased risk into their fees or returns. By doing so, companies essentially pass on the cost of risk management to consumers or partners. This strategy involves the careful analysis of risk profiles and potential financial impacts, balancing them against potential profits, and adjusting prices or returns accordingly. This nuanced dance requires not just a keen understanding of the legal risks involved but also astute business acumen to avoid pricing oneself out of the market.

At times, a firm may decide to accept the risk without seeking any form of recompense or protection. This is typically a calculated business decision, often made when the potential benefits far outweigh the potential losses, or when the costs of risk management strategies exceed the potential risks. This bold move requires a deep understanding of the legal landscape and potential impacts, as well as a willingness to face

potentially significant consequences should the risks materialise.

Assessing cross-border legal risk

The assessment of cross-border legal risk, especially within a commercial setting, is frequently grounded in overarching beliefs and assumptions about a foreign country's legal system. The process often involves more of a reliance on heuristic understanding of a foreign legal landscape than on detailed, comprehensive analysis. Occasionally, this reliance on generalized understanding can inflate fears and lead to overestimation of risks. This emphasizes the need for a balanced approach, blending the heuristic understanding with detailed, specific analysis to avoid overcompensation for perceived risks.

The complexity of cross-border legal risk management is further amplified when one considers the fact that the issues faced by Australian firms differ significantly depending on the countries and industries involved. Legal systems, regulatory environments, and business cultures vary widely from country to country, and what may be a significant risk in one country might be insignificant in another. Therefore, a more nuanced approach, which takes into account these variations, is necessary.

To this end, a country-by-country risk assessment approach is often appropriate. Such an approach involves identifying unique risks for each country within which Australian firms operate, and for each industry within those countries. This level of granularity enables a more targeted and effective risk management strategy, allowing firms to not only understand the risk landscape better but also develop more effective, tailored risk management strategies.

Moreover, the risk profile of an industry can vary widely from one country to another. Factors such as local regulations,

cultural attitudes, and economic conditions can impact how businesses in a particular industry operate, and therefore the risks they face. Therefore, not only is it necessary to consider the risk landscape on a country-by-country basis, but also within the specific industry context within each country.

By adopting such a multifaceted approach to cross-border legal risk management, Australian firms can enhance their capacity to navigate this complex landscape. This not only safeguards their interests but also ensures their continued ability to take advantage of the opportunities afforded by engaging in international trade and investment.

Author: Mahmoud Abuwaseel

Title: Partner – Disputes

Email: mabuwaseel@waselandwaseel.com

Profile:

<https://waselandwaseel.com/about/mahmoud-abuwaseel/>

Lawyers and consultants.

Tier-1 services since 1799.

www.waselandwaseel.com

business@waselandwaseel.com

Adapting to Change: Key Insights for In-House Counsel from Veteran GC David Cosgrave

October 8, 2024

David Cosgrave, Of Counsel in Australia at the law firm Wasel & Wasel, is no stranger to navigating the complex and ever-evolving legal landscape. With years of experience serving as a General Counsel (GC), he understands the unique challenges and demands of the role. In a recent interview on The Corporate Counsel Show, Cosgrave shared his insights on hiring

practices, risk management, and the role of in-house counsel in sensitive legal issues.

In-House Counsel: The Evolution and the Art of Adaptability

The role of in-house counsel has evolved significantly over the years, transforming from a strictly advisory role to an integral part of strategic business decision-making. This evolution calls for a new mindset, characterized by adaptability and a deep understanding of client motivations.

Reflecting on the changes in the legal field, an expert, David Cosgrave, provides some illuminating insights. With an extensive career as a General Counsel and currently Of Counsel at Wasel & Wasel, Cosgrave highlights that in his experience, the key to effectiveness in an in-house counsel role lies in understanding the nuances of motivations that drive various actors within an organization.

According to Cosgrave, the ability to truly comprehend the motivations of clients and stakeholders enables legal professionals to provide relevant and valuable advice. When discussing legal issues that are not part of the everyday legal spectrum, such understanding of human motivations becomes critical. The ability to balance the risk with client goals is a skill that is refined with such understanding.

For example, consider a scenario where an athlete refuses to take a drug test. A legal professional, who has a grasp of the athlete's motivations and goals, would be better equipped to provide counsel that balances legal requirements and the athlete's interests.

Moreover, this capability to adapt, to understand motivations, and to balance risks with goals is not something that is confined to dealing with exceptional situations. Cosgrave emphasizes that it is the key to delivering optimal legal advice in all situations, thus reinforcing the need for in-house counsel to develop these skills and apply them in their

roles.

Adaptability also implies a willingness to embrace the constant changes that are shaping the legal profession. In-house counsel roles today demand a heightened level of agility. This evolution can be largely attributed to the rise of technology, which has brought about new trends, developments, and challenges that are transforming the legal landscape.

Understanding and adapting to these changes is not just crucial for survival; it's also the key to leveraging the opportunities that come with these transformations. As Cosgrave articulates, the in-house counsel who manages to ride this wave of changes will have the upper hand in the new world of legal services. This adaptability may very well become the defining factor of success for in-house counsel in the years to come.

The evolving role of in-house counsel, thus, underscores the importance of a holistic approach to legal advice—one that takes into account the motivations of clients, the balancing of risk with goals, and the willingness to embrace and adapt to change.

Technological Transformations: Rising to the Challenge

The proliferation of technology in every sector has necessitated a new level of adaptability and learning for in-house counsel. These professionals now need to grasp the fundamental working of emerging technologies to deliver optimal legal advice.

David Cosgrave's experience as the first external lawyer to the first internet service provider in Australia provides a fascinating lens to this reality. Having witnessed the internet's transformative impact firsthand, Cosgrave shares that it is essential for legal professionals to keep abreast of technology's fast pace, as it profoundly impacts the legal

landscape.

In addition to an understanding of the current technology, Cosgrave highlights the need for legal professionals to anticipate the impact of future technologies. For instance, the advent of large language models like GPT and its successors could further transform the legal profession. Not only can these AI models automate routine tasks, but they also raise new legal and ethical questions, thereby challenging the traditional roles and practices of lawyers.

Yet, being tech-savvy is not about engaging in a never-ending arms race with emerging technologies. According to Cosgrave, it is more about understanding the basic principles of these technologies to navigate the legal challenges and opportunities they bring. This understanding allows legal professionals to strike a balance between leveraging technology and maintaining the human element in their work.

Cosgrave draws attention to a critical point in the discussion around technology and the legal profession – the importance of maintaining an evergreen approach. This approach means focusing on perennial principles, those that remain relevant irrespective of the technological changes. These principles, such as understanding client motivations, balancing risk and goals, and embodying adaptability, have stood the test of time and will continue to guide in-house counsel amid technological upheaval.

For example, as artificial intelligence becomes more integrated into legal processes, there may be ethical and legal considerations that challenge established norms. An evergreen approach would ensure that in-house counsel maintain professional ethics and provide sound, balanced legal advice, despite the transformative effects of technology.

In-house counsel, thus, stand at the intersection of technology and traditional legal principles. The challenge and

opportunity lie in embracing technology, understanding its impact, and adapting to the changes it brings, all while staying rooted in the evergreen principles of the legal profession.

The Evolving Role of General Counsel and the Legal Technician

As we continue to navigate through the rapid changes in technology, business environments, and societal norms, the roles of General Counsel (GC) and other legal professionals are also evolving. David Cosgrave suggests a shift from the traditional legal roles to a more goal-oriented approach to better serve clients.

Cosgrave mentions a trend of decreasing tenures for GC roles, shorter than the average CEO. This trend might be attributed to various factors such as increasing demands of the role, rapid changes in the business environment, and the stresses of managing risk in uncertain times. To succeed in this ever-changing landscape, GCs must adapt to new challenges and continuously learn and grow.

The traditional approach of focusing solely on legal risk is no longer sufficient. According to Cosgrave, GCs must balance risk management with goal achievement. This balance requires understanding the business's objectives, the risks involved in achieving these objectives, and providing legal advice that guides the business towards its goals without unnecessary legal exposure.

This shift in approach is a substantial transition from the traditional risk-averse mindset, requiring GCs to don a dual hat of a lawyer and a business advisor. Thus, the GC's role is expanding from providing legal advice to becoming strategic business partners, contributing to the organization's growth and success.

Another essential aspect of this evolving role is the differentiation between a lawyer and a legal technician.

Cosgrave emphasizes that this understanding is crucial for in-house lawyers to adapt to future changes. The ability to distinguish between legal advice (a lawyer's domain) and the procedural handling of legal issues (the legal technician's domain) will become increasingly important, especially with the rise of legal technology solutions.

A lawyer's role extends beyond knowing the law; it involves interpreting the law in the context of the client's situation, considering the risks and goals, and providing comprehensive advice. On the other hand, a legal technician focuses on the procedural aspects, which are increasingly being automated.

Adapting to this changing landscape requires an open mindset and a willingness to learn and grow. Embracing new technologies, adapting to new roles, and maintaining an evergreen approach to legal practice will ensure that in-house counsel continue to deliver value and effectively serve their clients.

The legal profession is at a crossroads, with exciting opportunities for those willing to adapt and grow. It is, therefore, a mix of optimism and apprehension, as GCs and other legal professionals navigate this changing landscape. But with adaptability, agility, and a focus on perennial principles, they will not only survive but thrive in this new era of law.

Author: Mahmoud Abuwaseh

Title: Partner – Disputes

Email: mabuwaseh@waselandwaseh.com

Profile:

<https://waselandwaseh.com/about/mahmoud-abuwaseh/>

Lawyers and consultants.

Tier-1 services since 1799.

www.waselandwaseh.com

business@waselandwaseh.com